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**IDEOLOGY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN ALBANIA**

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**Abstract:** In this paper, ideological confusion is explained based on the structural-functionalist perspective. Analysis of the phenomenon in question focuses mainly on the interdependence created between the “deeply-social” factors of and political discourse. This analysis is undertaken to better understand the circumstances that condition political parties on representing social categories in different social contexts and on showing the implications of political identity building based on the type of discourse used by the political actors. For this reason, while Almond (1968), Easton (1865), Luhmann (1981) analyze the ideology, they pay attention directly to the way of society structuring, and not as much to the political discourse. According to them, no partial aspect of social life and no isolated phenomenon can be understood unless it is linked with historical integrity and social structure conceived as a general unit. In this study, macro analysis focuses on the identification and treatment of several important indicators in terms of influences in structuring the political identity as important elements even for the empirical testing to the solutions this paper proposes. In this article the political discourse of Democratic Party and Socialist Party is analyzed in three different time periods, 1992 - 1996, 1997 - 2001 and 2002 - 2012. In the first period, on the one hand, the government of the right wing undertook many structural reforms, while on the other hand it does not neglect social assistance for certain groups affected by these reforms. During this period, the Socialist Party is focused more on dealing with itself in terms in order to break with the past than to create a particular profile in an ideological sense - in relation to the opponent. This approach makes political parties differ little from one another. The only difference between them in this period is the discourse: “anticommunism” and “antiberishism”. Democratic Party refers to the origin of Socialist Party to attack it for its relation with the past, while Socialist Party denounces the whole Democratic Party for its leadership qualities. More specifically, each attitude of SP in opposition was labeled as a reminiscence of the former Labour Party, while for the SP every each attitude of the government manifested authoritarian, provincial and tribal tendencies of Berisha.

**Keywords:** ideology, political parties, right, left, discourse, reforms, leaderships

**1. INTRODUCTION****1.1 The discourse of neoliberal reforms undertaken by DP during 1991 – 1996**

Among the ideological discourse of a party and its political action there are often differences. It is generally recognized that political parties cannot do without a certain demagogy. This does not mean that it is reflected in programs and government decision-making. So, content analysis of political discourse without facing political acts can lead to a wrong conclusion and a biased analysis. By this logic, a special significance was given to the examination of the programs of both major parties and their actions in government and in opposition in order to verify the validity / invalidity of above conclusion.

There is an ideological incoherence for various issues in the programs of democratic and the socialist governments. Simultaneously, there is a dominance of pragmatist and highly technical behavior from the doctrinal perspective. Let's refer chronologically to the programs of both major parties and their behavior using qualitative method of critical analysis of the discourse.

When Democratic Party took power, it faced a dilemma: on the one hand, the country needed deep structural reforms; on the other hand, it needed to provide social assistance to the groups most affected by these reforms. *Shock therapy* that was implemented by this political force, led to rapid closure or privatization of many state enterprises. The pace of privatization was high and it was stated that “in the middle of 1996 Albania was considered as one of the countries in transition with very high level of production coming from the private sector.” (ERBD, 2007: 11). However, the neoliberal doctrine, materialized through *shock therapy* in this period, led to the population facing “mass unemployment, uncontrolled demographic movement. The public sector, which was the main sector of employment in urban areas where the Democratic Party enjoyed greater support was reduced significantly.” “In 1995, only 276,000 people were employed in this sector, when in 1989 and 1992 respectively 615 000 and 889 000 people were employed. Between 1991 and 1993, income in urban areas fell on average by 30%, while in the same period income in rural areas increased by 50 %. Unemployment rose sharply – encouraging immigration. Between 1990 and 1996, about half a million Albanians left the country, mostly young people” (Biberaj, 2001: 74). In these conditions, the preservation of the unity of a society being fragmented by state with a smaller role, was an

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impossible mission. Now, the individual was alone in front of the market, unlike the communist past when he or she was a social entity going through state policies. Fuga (2003) describes this period as follows:

“This kind of ultraliberalism - imposed somewhat by the actual situation in the Albania of those years, this economic game without rules, this activity of production and services on which state had a small regulatory role, this completely spontaneous mechanism of setting the prices and directing the flow of capital - resembles a deformation of a very liberal economic model, in which the state and the law have strongly reduced their role in the economic life of the country. The state thus is distanced from the economy, and the economy avoids any kind of social content.”

Senior officials of the DP, as former Prime Minister Alexander Meksi, considers this period of governance as a very important one, because, thanks to radical reforms, many things changed, such as the growth in production, increase in per capita income, reduction of inflation from 250 % to 20 - 30% and so on. The government took prompt measures to cope with the economic problems of the time, regardless of the political costs. It gave up the subsidization of agricultural products and industrial goods. The prices were increased, except those for the necessary items, such as bread and milk, which were liberalized in 1993. At this time, the government abolished a communist decree which envisaged that the workers formerly employed in state enterprises should benefit 80 % of the salary. However, on the other hand, to mitigate the effects of the large increase in prices, the government took measures to assist those customers who were unable to afford the high prices (Meksi, 2010). “These measures expressed strategy of Berisha, who was trying to balance the wish to continue the fundamental economic reforms with the necessity of ensuring the cooperation with the masses that were severely affected by these reforms” (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1994: 63).

In this period, democratic government also implemented a massive privatization program in order to expand the economic base, strengthening the middle class. In 1996 almost the entire agriculture, transportation, retail trade and housing were privatized. What is interesting is that most of those who entered the ranks of new businessmen were members of “the old nomenclature. Enterprises and most profitable stores were bought by former communist functionaries, creating thus the impression that, while they had lost political power, they had nowadays the economic power” (Andrews & Ovaliölu 1994).

Another problem this political force faced was the return of land properties. During the election campaign of 1992, DP promised that it would indemnify the former owners or would return the lands. After coming to power, Berisha dismissed these claims, arguing that the indemnification of former owners or full return of property created major social problems. Government, using a fundamental principle of the right, between the right to property and the effects of electoral costs, chose the latter (Fuga 2004).

During this period, the Socialist Party was more constrained to deal with itself in order to break away from the past than to play the role of the opponent. This political force faced a dilemma: to protect certain principles of the left with the cost of being labeled by the opponent as continuing the line of the Labour Party, or to be indifferent to ultraliberal reforms of the Right losing much of its doctrinal identity. In fact, referring to attitudes of this period, we see that this party preferred to hold second position. Even the few criticisms that came from the Socialist opposition on the negative effects of reforms in the economy on certain of social categories were labeled by the Democrat’s government as “clear tendency of a monstrous opposition trying to return at any cost the communist regime, cooperatives, and queues to buy bread and so on.” (Berisha, 1993:2). Democratic Party, at this time, was using people’s hatred towards the former communist regime. Moreover, a significant part was scared of a possible return. Thus, the Socialist Party, thanks to the government propaganda, was seen by many people as a threat to democracy and showed inferiority in attitudes that should have had on some reforms. This circumstance forced PS occasionally to explain the differences with the Labour Party and also to support market reforms and liberalization of society. The socialists needed to create the idea of a modern and open party.

This dichotomy in the behavior of the two political forces, especially the left, was limiting them the opportunity to play a role in the aggregation of different interests. They exhibited the phenomenon of inclusion as we refer to Diamond, Lipset, Rokkan. Programs of such parties tend to be inclusive, because they have pressure from different directions and are often in disagreement with each other. However, when a party begins to display comprehensive features, it can move towards the center of the political spectrum, becoming more flexible and pragmatic. They were not like the ideological parties, which have certain goals and have a membership focused on a specific issue or set of issues and address to a selective membership (Laclau & Mouffe, 1996:151). In the Albanian context, both political parties, from the standpoint discourse, had almost the same stance to the market economy, social justice, pluralistic political democracy, to international partnerships. Consequently, the political landscape, as expressed by the experienced publicist and politician Pellumbi, resembled more a “political cocktail in which different components are distinguished only by the color shades, not so separate and distinct” (2007: 71).

Unable to build a vision of society whose source are certain groups or social strata, political parties in this period created the differentiation of society by blaming the opponent. DP used the origin of SP, while DP the leadership qualities. In this context, one must understand the birth of discourse: “anticommunist” and “antiberishist”, and the discourse with racial and provincial features: “northern” or “southern”. The “other” is reduced to a basic essence (race, culture) in order to explain everything. Thus, this form of discourse made it even more difficult the articulation of specific social identities, such as farmers, workers and intellectuals, as they lost in the “communist”, “democrat”, “northern”, “souther”, “mountaineer”, “laluc” etc. The less DP was able to represent specific social groups through an ideological order, the more it articulated the “democrat” in relation to anti-communist threat, and “northerner” in relation to the “southern” threat. PS was doing the same thing. This form of discourse divided population among those who were still nostalgic for the communist regime and those who were victims of the regime, among those who were northern and those who were southern. SP focused its criticism on the qualities of the leader Berisha as “authoritarian”, “northern”, “conservative”, etc. This strategy, in terms of discourse, “undermined” the creation of their political identities.

### **1.2 The discourse of neoliberal reforms of SP in the period 1997 – 2001**

The collapse of pyramid schemes in 1997 prompted an armed revolt to overthrow the institutions of the state in most parts of the country. The inability of democrat’s government to mitigate the consequences of the collapse of pyramid schemes to lenders and inability of state institutions to control riots proved that this government had failed to build sustainable institutions. As a result of the chaotic situation created in the country, parliament was forced to announce state of emergency on 2<sup>nd</sup> of March 1997. Riots in this period led to economic stagnation, high unemployment and the departure of foreign investors. ALL (Albanian Lek) which had been one of the most stable currencies in Eastern Europe, was devalued 50 % between January and June 1997. In 1997 the economy fell 8% (McAdams 1997). The economic crisis also affected the “basis of government revenue. The inflation was increased up to 55 %.”(Malaj, 1997: 3). In this general situation, the Socialist Party and its allies took power after early elections.

Government at this time faced three pressing tasks: to restore order, to begin the process of national reconciliation and to revive the plagued economy by restoring financial order in the country. As soon as the Socialist Party and its allies took power, under the influence of the IMF and World Bank, they changed many aspects of economic and social life and privatized key state enterprises unlike it was promised and written in its program. This “neoliberal” behavior of the Left explained somewhat by the fact that the Socialists sought to rid the weight of their totalitarian and centralized past, and to present themselves in front of the internationals and the public with a new face of integration into the path of globalization. But, apart from the aspect of the image, a very important component was the macroeconomic situation of the country. Many economists had the view that aid of international organizations in the form of grants or soft loans was the only hope for the country to recover quickly. Thus, after the need for economic support on one side, and after the change the image on the other hand, this political force had to fulfill the recommendations given by foreign organisms despite the effects that arose in doctrinal terms.

During the period 1998-1999, the socialist government, taking advantage of previous experience of the Democratic Party, privatized over 500 entities as enterprise, business etc. “This process dynamically re-dimensioned the state’s role in various aspects and involved about 80 % of all assets of the economy in the sectors of energy and minerals, oil and gas, post and telecommunications, etc.” (Angeli, 2007:134). For many experts, this government’s behavior supported the argument of political analysts that the Right in opposition and Left in power differed a little or did not differ at all from each other in terms of doctrine. This approach is illustrated clearly by their headlines in the press. In the newspaper “Shekulli”, an article published at the time was titled, “Left, Right or Both?” (Rakipi, 1999: 1).

The financial situation forced the government to intensify relations with international institutions like the World Bank, IMF, WTO, etc. despite their constraints for different reforms. The hesitation regarding this policy was almost zero, as Socialists knew that, without the help of international financial organizations, without loans and financing of Brussels, Albanian state and society could not function, and they could not recover the situation of the events of ’97. This subservience to international factors was related to some extent with the fact of the impact that they had in the country in terms of providing political credentials. “At a time when the legitimacy of the Albanian institutions continued to be problematic in the public eye, this legitimacy was often acquired from the collaboration with international institutions.” (Barbullushi, 2008: 4). In the eyes of the public, that local political actor that had close relations with the international community, that was able to provide more assistance to the country, that progressed fast towards country’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures, was certainly more “legitimate” in the domestic scene.

This made it more difficult the aspect of articulating specific social identities, such as workers, intellectuals, liberal professions, marginalized groups, girls and women, civil servants, etc., which were “lost” in the “people” category.

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In these conditions, this political force built its political identity despite the "anti-state" risk for which the opposition was blamed (Kajsiu, 2008). A similar strategy to the one was pursued by the Democratic Party in government in 1992 - 1996. The strategy in question deepened the political tension and the conflict between majority and opposition.

The two political forces use the past as a subject matter for political discourse. PS connected events of '97 and authoritarian and nepotistic qualities of leader Sali Berisha, while DP connected the way SP took power with the communist mentality of taking power by force. In this period, the political conflict made the public feeling increasingly unrepresented. In a survey conducted in 2000 by USAID, it resulted that 60% of people felt they were not represented by the leadership and political parties. These political forces were increasingly perceived by citizens as parties that were inclined more on accusing each other than competing their programs and alternatives for the best interests of the country.

### **1.3. The discourse of European integration in the period 2002 - 2012**

Referring to the critical approach of the discursive hegemony of Laclau dhe Moeffe (2001), the issue of ideology could be expressed as the creation of nodal points of a discourse, which hegemonizes into extremes the alternatives discourses. Hegemonized discourse does not rely on strong grounds of any materiality or objectivity, but presents non-support and relativity of nodal point as a self-founded, the self-sufficient or self-referring. Specifically, Zizek (2009) referring to nodal point, claims that it is an empty marker or rather, marker without being marked, whose importance is functionally structural. It exists in discourse as the ghost, without the existence of which other elements of ideology would not have any identifying connection.

Emptiness of terms – form the ideological content – is clearly showed in discourse of EU aspirant countries. In the Albanian case, the idea of Europe appears as nodal point, which does not mean anything (in the sense of a direct connection with any fixed content), but precisely this “nothing” enables serve as a hub where are associated different element of discourse. In fact, the in the Albanian political discourse, integration into the European Union back in a uncontestable priority for every Albanian government. Determining priorities in EU reports comprise more or less the government program of the political force in power. It is not a coincidence that priorities determined in Stabilization and Association reports, such as corruption, the fight against trafficking of human beings or the strengthening of borders, constitute the main topics of the program of socialist government and later of the democrat government.

Integration issues define the political agenda of the two opposing forces. Their competition was related more to the timing of implementation and human capacities to meet them than the debate about the axis left - right. In the Albanian political scene, reports, reviews and evaluations of the EU "were made the epicenter of the debate, as well as discussions on achievements, challenges and decisions of the present and the future" (Elbasan, 2004: 41).

This attitude is proved, if we refer to the year 2000, when the EU drafted a plan called The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), in which were defined the specific conditions Albania had to fulfill to join the EU. It was called Conditionality Paradigm, according to which a democratized Albania had to meet the conditions for EU membership. This plan involved a list of priorities to be met in one year or over a long period of time.

From a content point of view such a plan focuses mainly on technology of democratization, which is not left or right, but right or wrong. In this context, Prime Minister Nano, in a lecture about EU integration, declared before the audience: "We should not waste time with doctrinal or ideological debates" (2004: 3). Ultimately, "... the models of legislative institutions, procedures for the administration and organization of the market, banks, insurance companies ... are standard models." (Ibidem). The issue is simply to acceleration of implementation.

This type of government policy articulation of the left produced a political discourse that emphasized more the technical aspect of reforms for the installation of democracy and market economy rather than ideological aspect. It was highlighted the term "standard reform", used by the former Prime Minister Fatos Nano. According to this logic, "the people" was projected in relation to its European future rather than on specific social strata, or in the framework of any ideological universe (Kajsiu, 2007: 32).

The line followed by the two main political forces was mostly stimulated by the public. Many people viewed EU membership as an extra guarantee to control and limit political irresponsibility of the political elite, which without the supervision of Europe did not respect democratic norms. The more the local electorate felt desperate toward local policies, the more the salvation was required by the European Union. Popular phrases like "Albania cannot be built with Albanians" are not accidental, but reflect this profound political pessimism. Referring to Human Security Survey 2003, 67 % of respondents felt that Albania was suffering from political conflict (Human Security Survey, 2003: 6). The same opinion is confirmed in another poll, two years later, in 2005, where respondents "ranked political instability (described as "fights among politicians") at the same level as shortage of water and electricity" (Ilirijan, 2005: 81). Political parties were increasingly perceived by the citizens that they dealt more with the

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bickering between them rather than serving the public interest. Consequently, the more political elite was delegitimized before the local electorate, the more political actors required approval, support and legitimacy from international institutions in general and European ones in particular.

Under these conditions, at least nominally, are adopted these discourses and priorities whose sources are these organizations that do not necessarily reflect the main concerns of the electorate. So, “the political actors, in their attempts to legitimize themselves, further widen their distance with the citizens.” (Cili, 2007: 52). This produced a vicious circle that deepened even more the democratic deficit, because, as the legitimacy of political elites in relation to the electorate became increasingly lower, more legitimacy was required by the international factor.

This explains, according to Barbullushi (2007) why socialist government very eagerly signed free trade agreements with its neighbors in the context of European integration. Often, free trade agreements were considered as great successes of socialist government. Social groups were treated in relation to the European future, without taking into account the effects of these reforms on these groups. This aspect is reflected in the report of Soros (2009) where it was highlighted that it was surprising that the Albanian businessmen realized that their products could not compete with Macedonian ones only after the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement with Macedonia. This does not mean that the government was not aware of the costs of liberalized trade on various social groups. But, the government used the public awareness toward EU institutions and it provided security, so that such actions were not condemned in terms of political cost. In 2004, Prime Minister Nano stated that Albanian exports “are not even 1/5 of imports and for the agricultural produce this report is 1/10, which means that the benefits from market expansion have been slow.”(2004:2). However, EU integration was considered as a process proving benefits for the society in general, not for specific groups within it. On the other hand there is a neoliberal trend in terms of the nature of reforms. There is also a clear deviation from the doctrine of the Left and priority is given to privatizations of public assets, jobs cuts as a necessity to reform particular sectors, further liberalization of markets, easing the fiscal burden to further stimulate business development etc. And what is more important, is the pro-European tendency.

For many analysts, this trend toward the Right was explained in the context in which Socialists were exercising their power. The country was facing a growing need to build new and modern infrastructure, while fiscal revenues accounted for 18% of GDP - the lowest levels in Europe. Banks and enterprise still had difficulty in crediting the economy. The balance deficit of the foreign trade had reached one third of GDP. Foreign investment continued to remain under the absorbing capacities of the economy and our national resources. This situation undoubtedly wanted to “re-capitalize” the national economy through sales at auction or privatization in favor of foreign capital or large domestic capital. Precisely, this liberal policy of the Left, says Fuga (2003) has faded the doctrinal aspect this political force was meant to implement. In these circumstances, Socialists had no choice but to ascertain that they were doing the same thing they had done when they were in power.

In this period, opposition is not based on government behavior in relation to the level of representation of social categories that theoretically the force is supposed to protect, or in relation to the privatization but, in relation to corruption and inefficiency regarding the degree of integration into EU structures. Every social problem was reflected in slow steps towards integration and high-level corruption. The raw material to build opposition was the EU reports. The epicenter of the debate during the period 2001 – 2005 was focused on the urgent need to fight corruption, organized crime and trafficking as obstacles to Albania's EU integration. So criticism of DP did not address to the SP policies itself, but to the corruptive way they were implemented.

Europeanization language turned the discourse of every other field into political discourse, while political alternatives were void doctrinal content. Such an approach paled respective ideological identities producing a political discourse that emphasized the technical aspect of reforms for the installation of democracy and market economy and a series of reforms to the social nature. At the same time, it kept going the conflict about the terms without ideological content as a need to be differentiated. Not without reason, the Socialist Party in the 2005 election campaign focused on the qualities of the opposition leader Sali Berisha and the crisis of 1997. Its motto election was “Protect the future”. Television spots of SP combined images from the funeral of the victims of 1997 with fragments from a speech Berisha during the time when he was President as saying, “This is just the beginning.” All investments made during the socialist government buildings were shown beside those burned during 1997. So the whole investment of SP election campaign of 2005 “was based on what could be summarized as ‘danger coming from Berisha’.”(Lubonja, 2005:10). Meanwhile, opposition was constructing all its campaign based on the fight against corruption. Its slogan was “With clean hands”.

PD program and tomorrow's governance manifested two trends the previous socialist government: the continuation of policies that dealt with Europeanization processes and initiatives for social justice. In a leftist manner, and even a somewhat utopian left, the DP program includes: “Policies and social instruments will be reformed in such a way that no individual will live under poverty level” or “No child shall be abandoned, each child will have the care it



Basically, the process of democratization is seen more as an application of a model and some specific reforms rather than a political dynamic process. This is a common feature of the international factor in the Albanian democratization processes: neglect or reduction of political process in reforms, matrices and models. In the best case, such approaches see politics as a way to implement EU integration reforms, strengthen the administration or fight against corruption, while in the worst case, politics is viewed as activities that impede the implementation of reforms and strengthening of institutions (Kajsiu 2008). In both cases, politics is seen as a phenomenon that should be disciplined or exceeded. However, in the process of democratization, that is part of the problem and not of the solution. The same thing can be said for its contribution in terms of building doctrinal identities.

## CONCLUSIONS

The central idea of this study was concerned with the crisis of representation in Albania, which stems mainly from the fact that neither of the two main parties fails to build its and electorate ideological identity (substantive) who should represent. Thus, each of the political forces in their discourse time to time use the right and lefts element elements, as a result of internal and external factors.

The study explained that the prevailing of neoliberal reform spirit, especially at the first decade after the change of system and governments Euro-Atlantic integration processes in the second decade, have "alienated" citizen, making even more difficult for political parties the articulation and representation of different social groups. In this context, much less representative of special interest political parties become less identified social groups with political parties. On the other hand, much less reach groups to identify the harder it is to represent the needs and demands by political parties. This vicious circle, has created fluidity of party identities and social groups in years, therefore the relationship between them has been inconsistent and unclear.

On paper was drop in three periods: 1992 - 1996, 1997 - 2001 and 2002 - 2012 to analyze the political discourse of the two main political parties: PD and PS and further explained the factors that have produced this political discourse. More specifically, the study remained at not structuring of social groups and subgroups in rural, peri-urban and urban areas, the uncertainty of the elites, the impact of FMN policies and the transformation of politics as a result of the mass media.growing influence.

Another important aspect of the study was related to the survey, regarding electoral behavior in cases of discrepancy between the programme and ideology. In general, it was argued that when noted discrepancy between the programme and the ideology, the general electorate opinion was that it should not be punished by not voting, little except make the PS electorate. This means that the majority of voters manifested pragmatic behavior when judging the performance of a political force. This provided a negative impact on how political parties ideologically structure their programmes and their political activities, because they know that the majority of the electorate considers more the results obtained than the ideological content of the reforms.

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