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**COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY OF REVOLUTION**

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**Abstract:** These theories, despite of their weaknesses, were quite influential, however very soon some corrections of their basic standpoints emerged, simultaneously creating the conditions to launch new studies of the revolutions. This was inevitable, because the first sociological studies of the revolution by Edwards, Petty and Brinton were an attempt to make a generalization of the process of revolution on the basis of the study of the several cases of revolution.

Rejecting their approach as too historical, that is, non-sociological, the researchers of the revolutions in the subsequent period will strive to base their researches on the study of an increased number of cases in order to achieve increased scientific and methodological relation and application of the statistical analyses. In this regard, the revolution can only be studied as a separate form of the more extensive social occurrences. This idea of the manner of study of the revolutions was presented and developed for the first time by Sorokin, in the period between the two world wars. His research was based on the study of numerous cases of internal unrests in long-term time periods.

The same idea was also implemented in the modern studies of internal wars. In the book “Internal war” 195, Harry Eckstein points out that the internal war is not the same as some other terms that are being widely used (revolution, civil war, rebellion, insurrection, guerilla war, jacquerie, coup d’état, terrorism etc.) According to this author, the internal war is a genus, and the other indicated occurrences are its species, whereby the internal wars would be observed as an entirety, while the comparative categories (the indicators for determination of the differences) are implemented once they become necessary, whereby a possibility for a development of general theories is created. At the same, the probability increases that the determined differences will be valid and precise, scientifically founded and also to enable the introduction of a description in the specific cases.

Several studies are published in this period, and with a profound study of the material about specific revolutions or most of them, they strive to present some general conclusions, however not presenting them in a form of rigid models which would imply for all revolutions or all forms of unrest and rebellions in the human society. This model of profound study of the history of revolution, or history-in-depth approach, is known as a comparative history of the revolution. This methodological approach in the study of the revolution we will elaborate by elaborating the most important studies that quite successfully and in a representative manner reflect the presented approach.

**Keywords:** analysis, study, revolution.

## INTRODUCTION

In the light of these studies, in the very beginning we will present the opinions of Barrington Moore presented in his study “Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy”.<sup>196</sup>

According to his analyses, there are three forms of transition from a traditional society, according to the analyses of the experiences from several countries in the East and the West.

The first form leads through the bourgeois revolution to capitalism and democracy of western type (England, France and USA), whose civil war according to Moore was a revolution cause with the political incompatibility of the slavery and the capitalist democratic order.

The second form in which the bourgeois revolution experienced failure, leads to capitalism with weak democratic features (Germany and Japan) that pass through the period of fascism.

The third form leads through great peasant revolutions to the communist regimes where forceful modernization of the society is conducted (the Soviet Union and China).

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<sup>195</sup> Ecksteih, H.(1964).Ed. Internal War. New York: Free Press. p. 10.

<sup>196</sup> Barrington, M, Jr. (1966). Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Pesant in the Making of the Modern World, Boston: Beacon Press.

In addition to these three basic forms, Moore points out another form where despite the established system of parliamentary democracy, the incentives towards modernization of the society are weak because neither bourgeois nor peasant revolution happened (India).

Moore considers that the eruption or the failure of the revolution, as well as its specific character, are vital for the appropriate types of social development – democratic capitalist regimes, authoritarian and fascist regimes, communist regimes etc.

The revolution essentially is the determining point in the historical process and it has important consequences on the specific societies.

## 2. SKOCPOL'S STUDY OF REVOLUTIONS

From the point of view of the application of the comparative-historical approach, an important study is the one by Theda Skocpol "States and Social Revolutions".<sup>197</sup>

In this most important empirical study, Skocpol compares the revolutions in France (1788), China (1911) and Russia (1917). The author claims that in all three cases, the activities of the countries and the unfavorable positions that overtook them, played the key role in the eruption of revolutions. According to Skocpol, the revolution is a macro-historical occurrence which can be most validly researched with the application of the comparative-historical analysis. It tries to prove that in the three revolutions, there is an existence of similar causal forms, although they differ in many segments, that is, the analyzed countries led a policy that resulted in a reduction of their power, which inevitably led to a situation for a specific classes to "ruin" the state.

Although the class conflict was an important factor in all revolutions, we cannot understand any of the revolutions if we don't analyze the role of the country as an autonomous actor. All three countries were "imperial countries", which means differentiated, centrally coordinated, administrative and military hierarchies that functioned under the protection of the absolute monarchy." Although the circumstances that led to a revolution were different, Skocpol claims that in them "the revolutionary crisis started to develop when the old national regimes were no longer capable to respond to the challenges imposed by the international situation".<sup>198</sup> Skocpol concludes that "in three cases"... the final effect of opposition of the reforms that were conspired by the state was the fall of the monarchist autocracy and the disintegration of the centralized administrative and military organization of the country".<sup>199</sup> Each of these three regimes was toppled from power with a combination of external pressures of other countries and manner whereby the "agrarian relation of the production and the land-owning governing class impaired the stability of the state institutions".

"In all three countries, the revolutions led to a breakdown of the old regimes, however sooner or later they were replaced by regimes where the government was even more centralized and which had more autonomy than the old regimes: Napoleon's regime in France and the communist regimes in China and Russia. Skocpol speaks that it is a matter of clear examples of countries that concentrated power, and sometimes undertook steps to protect their own interests, rather than the interests of the different groups of the society."<sup>200</sup>

Skocpol's work is one of the most influential recent theories of the revolution, a work which to a great extent criticized the former models of reductionism, although the very author was caught in an identical trap by focusing only on two main causes for the analyzed "great revolutions": the political crisis and the peasant uprising.

Its "social-structural" theory is directed towards the impact of different political and social institutions on the ability of the countries to face the international conflicts. "Comparing the French, the Russian and the Chinese revolution, she notes that every revolution emerged when the country faced with some more advanced capitalist countries. Skocpol also notes that in each of these countries there is a combination of structural weaknesses that limit the country to respond to the international pressures and for this reason it creates a potential for a revolutionary crisis: undeveloped agriculture which cannot support a modern army (Russia)"; autonomous elites that may block the attempts to increase taxes or to fix the efficiency of the state administration (France and China); or autonomous villages that may be organized for attacks of the land owners in an event of weakening of the central government (France and Russia)".<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> Skocpol, T. (1979). *States and Social Revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.p.33-40.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid: pp. 33-40.

<sup>199</sup> Ibidem: pp. 33-40.

<sup>200</sup> Haralambos, M., Holborn, M. (2002). *Sociologija, teme i perspective*. Zagreb: Golden Marketing, p. 624.

<sup>201</sup> Miller, D. (2002). *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*. Skopje: MI-AH, p. 374.

According to all basic premises that arise from the work, inevitably a conclusion imposes that “the combination of military pressure from the economically more developed countries, the structural obstacles for the state activities and the peasant autonomy that encouraged effective peasant uprisings, produced revolutions.”<sup>202</sup>

Its structural analyses focused on the decisive and autonomous role that the country may play in the mediation between the groups.

Goldstone claims that Skocpol’s theory should be combined with a significant attention in regard to the effects of the long-term economic and population policy. He notes that “although the international military pressures are almost a constant aspect of the European policy since 1500-1850 (nothing is different today as well – author’s note), the revolutions in this period occurred on two occasions, from 1550 to 1650 and from 1750 to 1850. Noting that both periods were a time of a quick population growth. Goldstone indicates that in the densely populated pre-industrial countries, the quick growth of the population may have an impact on the stability of prices, the governmental finance, the recruiting of the elite and the life standard of the population.”<sup>203</sup> In this regard, Goldstone concludes that the result of the combination of these effects “may create obstacles for the state administration” and intensify the conflicts between the groups that fight for power and status, thereby increasing the risk that the routine wars or the domestic wars will lead to a revolutionary crisis.<sup>204</sup>

The comparative-historical analysis of the revolutions developed in the studies of Barrington Moor and Theda Skocpol represents one of the most fruitful and most acceptable approaches in the study of revolutions. This method in the field of social sciences and history implies a renewal of a new, synthetic approach in the study of revolutionary changes.

“The modern understanding of the revolution”, reasonably concluded Hannah Arendt, “is inextricably related to the idea that the course of history suddenly starts from the beginning, that the completely new history, so far unknown and untold, should start to take place all over”.<sup>205</sup>

### **3. “ABOUT THE REVOLUTION” AND HANNAH ARENDT**

In the modern sociological theories of revolutions, Hannah Arendt is a known representative of the modern social philosophy, with its critical opposed attitude in regard to the dominant way of analysis of the revolutions present in the same. According to Arendt, revolutions are something more than successful uprisings and there is no justification to name every coup d’état or every rebellion, royal conspiracy or a civil war as revolution. The use of violence in all these occurrences and in the revolution, is not sufficient to equalize these occurrences.

“Violence is by no means more convenient (more acceptable) to describe the occurrence of revolutions from changes: only where the change happens in terms of a new beginning, where the violence is used in order to establish a completely different form of government, to cause the creation of a new political body, where the liberation from the submission (oppression) at least aims for a constitution of freedom, we can speak of revolution.”<sup>206</sup>

With this conclusion, Arendt initiates another essential question: If the occurrence of revolutions is inseparably related to the idea of freedom, then all great revolutions according to their social consequences are not revolutions in the real sense of the word.

Hannah Arendt, one of the most important and most influential modern political philosophers in his work “About revolution (1963)”, trying to answer the question of the essence of revolution, at the same time asks herself what is the thing that makes the revolutionary tradition, and how much that tradition in its initial, source form is still alive and influential. According to Arendt, the revolution was often based only on one of its sides, mostly on violence, which is no case is sufficient to penetrate into its essence. Analyzing the revolution in this manner, many modern researchers to a great extent actually neglect these important properties according to which it is significantly different than the other forms of social changes, collective actions, violence. In this research, a simple truth is excluded, that the revolution is a complete reorder of a social order, of its political structure and system of values.

This is exactly what Hannah Arendt emphasizes, the idea of the news – the novelty that comes i.e. the movement from the beginning, the main trait of revolution. According to Arendt, “the revolutions are the only political events that directly face us with the problem of commencement”.<sup>207</sup> This phenomenon of

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<sup>202</sup> Ibid: p. 374.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid: p. 374.

<sup>204</sup> Ibidem: p. 374.

<sup>205</sup> Arendt, H. (1973). On revolution, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, p. 146.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid: p. 25.

<sup>207</sup> Arendt, H.(1973). On revolution. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, p. 21.

commencement is inevitably put in correlation with the idea of freedom. Actually, the first two great modern revolutions – the American and the French one, strived towards establishment of the order of freedom, that is, satisfaction of the endeavor of people for and towards freedom, their wish to participate in the creation of the public life. In addition, their strive and need to start all over in the rearrangement of the social and the political institutions is visible and expected – end of the old and beginning of the new one with a complete and free participation of all entities in the public life, in the creation of their future and the future of their new society.

The revolution once again represents the most shining example of the human power to freely and thoughtfully lay the foundations of a completely new political order. Hence, the revolution should be performed for an establishment of an order of freedom, rather than being performed in the name of freedom, and essentially to establish an order of a non-freedom. In this regard, according to the determination of Hannah Arendt, we can speak of two types of revolutions – revolutions that establish institutions of freedom (constitution *libertatis*) and revolutions that establish an order of non-freedom.

When he analyzes the American revolution, Arendt emphasizes the unusual and fruitful intersection of the two ideas – the idea of the freedom and the idea of conservativeness, ideas which will have nothing in common in the revolutions later on.

In the following period, these two ideas will turn into an antipode which will be fatal for their success, that is, it will represent one quite strongly expressed factor which will pave the way to their failure and total collapse. From the French revolution onward, both revolution and conservativeness stop to complement each other and they no longer have anything in common, which inevitably opens the process of the beginning of their “unpredictable”, however inglorious ending.

In addition, Hannah Arendt reminds of another paradox which is typical in the considerations of the revolution. Despite of the fact that the French revolution was unsuccessful, despite of the distortion of its basic political ideal of freedom, still it would have a decisive impact on the subsequent revolutions and the revolutionary tradition. However, according to Hannah Arendt, the French revolution ended in non-freedom and dictatorship and tyranny, (unlike the American revolution which was and remained political), because it was also a social revolution – a liberation of the people from the material misery and poverty. The violence and the tyranny in the French revolution, according to Hannah Arendt were “an inevitable consequence of the failure to resolve the social issue”.<sup>208</sup>

Criticizing the attitudes of the greatest theoretician of revolution – Moris in regard to freedom, and in this context, his opinion at the relation liberty-human-revolution, she will conclude that is not the liberty, rather the abundance that became an objective of the revolution. The transformation of the human rights into rights of *sans-culottes* represented a moment of a turning point not only in the French revolution, but also of all following revolutions. Its understanding of the revolution and the freedom was not only antipode towards the viewpoints of the French *sans-culottes* and the Russian Bolsheviks, but it was necessarily directed towards the usual liberal view of the justification of the institutions of the representative democracy and the fight of the political parties. What denotes the modern parties is “their autocratic and oligarchic structure, lack of internal democracy and freedom, preference of the right to infallibility<sup>209</sup>-something which is a current topic today as well, as a tendency in the Macedonian party ambience and a way to organize and act on the political parties – party political and life. Even the “fiercest” supporters of the doctrines of Marx and Lenin would agree wholeheartedly with her attitudes.

Despite of the numerous inconsistencies and getting into some utopian advices and opinions, the most significant thing is her criticism to the revolutions that ended in tyranny, as well as the criticism directed towards the theoreticians of these revolutions. Still, her book “About revolution” can hardly be read without associations and questions regarding the “democratic revolutions” that dashed against most of the European continent (up to Russia), which swept from the political map yesterday’s authoritarian communist regimes. The attempt for a “democratic revolution” in China ended on the square Tiananmen under the tanks of the Chinese army, however the “evolutionary development” of China experiences an enormous overall progress and an unseen economic boom in historical context.

#### **4. THE NEW WAVE OF “REVOLUTIONARY THEORIES” – THEORIES OF REVOLUTIONS**

The recent works on the theory of revolutions didn’t make any significant “revolutionary” jump in regard to the previously presented studies on revolutions. The new wave of “revolutionary theories” focuses on the research of typical problems through more narrowly determined historical and comparative studies. Hence, for example

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid: p. 59-114.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid: p. 268.

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Goldfrank uses the structural model of Skocpol to explain the origin of the Mexican revolution. Abrahamian uses an identical model to analyze the revolution in Iran which abounds with many specifics in regard to the previous revolutions.

Trimberger expanded the structural theory of the revolutions and performed its modification in order to include i.e. to elaborate the cases of “the evolutions from inside”. In this regard, as typical examples he points out the events according to which Japan in 1868 and Turkey in 1921 “lived through” the breakdown of the country and new institutional building. What is important for these “evolutions from the inside” is that the process of the breakdown of the country and the conflict of power lasted relatively shortly and they were major tectonic social quakes, because they were largely limited to the elites. According to her claims, this type of revolution of the elite is primarily due to the conditions in the more extensive surrounding of the country i.e. it is a result of the pressure performed by the more advanced countries on their “system in agony”.

In these cases, instead of the structural weakness emphasized by Skocpol, there is a highly-professional, seriously elaborated bureaucratic elite, seriously dedicated to serve the government, an elite that has capacities, however even more flexibility to restructure (modernize) the institution in order to successfully face and amortize all forms of the internal pressure – pressures.

In the new wave of studies and disputes on revolutions, there are inevitable debates of Wolf, Paige, Migdal, Scott and Popkin regarding the determination of the factors that manage the peasant participation in the revolutions. In regard to this important problematic, their attitudes are different to a great extent and they cover a wider spectrum of considerations. Hence, for example, Scott points out the role of the common peasant culture, Paige concentrates on the economic relations as cultivators with the land-owners. Migdal and Wolf emphasize the penetration of the capitalist enterprises and the growth of the population in the villages, while Popkin points out the efforts of the peasants to gain an advantage to the detriment of their fellow peasants – very important factors with relative importance in different situations. In the entire set of analyzed factors, one thing (segment) still remains unclear, that is, insufficiently explained: “the attractiveness of the communist movement for the peasants does not lie in the internal attraction of the communist ideology”; instead, the communist parties were more open for the village ideals and more flexible and more persistent in the organization of the peasants than before the pre-communist governments”.<sup>210</sup>

For his theoretical explications, Rude studied the police files of the revolutionary masses and concluded that they were not irrational crowds as Le Bon claimed, rather primarily they comprised of prominent workers and craftsmen who had a vision and a clear goal to protect their economic interests.

The further analyses and knowledge of the workers’ movement launched by Traugott, Calhoun and Aminzade show the manner how the revolutionary movements obtain force from the defense of the traditional rights of the workers.

In order to complete the image of “the revolutions on the inside”, Rejai and Philips examined the revolutionary leaders and determined that actually these leaders are not charismatic and do not create revolutions; “instead the revolutionary situations-state dissolutions and conflicts for state power-give space to the individuals that otherwise, probably would have traditional professions, to outgrow into revolutionary roles”.<sup>211</sup>

Unlike the claims of Arendt about revolutions, Skocpol, Eckstein, Walton and Tardanico, studying the long-term results of the revolutions identified many factors that have an impact on these results. They conclude that the socialist governments mostly emerge when the “economic resources are concentrated in several centers of capital, when their mobilization is large and when the external pressures from the capitalist countries are moderate; the capitalist governments are most probable otherwise”.<sup>212</sup>

However, as both Kelly and Klein claim, “neither the socialist, nor the capitalist revolutions could not reduce the inequalities of the income or the impossibilities, except for a very short period.”<sup>213</sup> According to that, the tendencies for a hierarchy are obviously strong in all societies, even in the ones who experienced “the revolutionary zeal”.

At the end of the last decade of the twentieth century, Immanuel Wallerstein in his work “Utopistics” will try to prove that “so called revolutions”<sup>214</sup> were still an important element in the development of the history of the

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<sup>210</sup> Miller, D.(2002). The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought. Skopje: MI-AH, p. 375.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid: p. 375.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid: p. 375.

<sup>213</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>214</sup> Note: Wallerstein speaks of “so called revolutions” because according to his study, in the countries included in the modern world system there were no revolutions and actually they were not even possible, if revolution

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contemporary world system because they applied important parameters in the manners how the world system developed as an entirety. When he speaks of the French Revolution, Wallerstein emphasizes that she opened Pandora's box and initiated the strives of the people, their expectations and hopes, which the established governments and the conservatives and liberals were not able to stop.

The world revolution from 1848 represents a story of the stable warming of the popular unrest in various types and in different places. The world revolution (1848) or a revolution of the world system represented an unexpectedly great shock for all ruling parties. "The nineteenth century was not only a century of the national demands for democratization and a century of the occurrence of the liberal ideology as the most efficient manner to prevent these requirements".<sup>215</sup> When he speaks of the Russian evolution, about its importance and impact at global lever, Wallerstein points out "that the Russian revolution had a deep impact on the geoculture, however not on a manner that is drastically different that the one pointed out by the Bolshevik theory."<sup>216</sup>

"The message of the Russian revolution had a different impact on the world of powerful nations, the one which we can shortly call a Pan-European world, than in the non-European world. Retrospectively, there is no doubt that the danger of a more militant attitude of the working class in the powerful nations, the danger that symbolizes the world communist movement, galvanized the current response of the governing classes of these countries. The result was an important raise of the stake, which will be necessary in the liberal package to calm the working classes of the Pan-European countries. This particularly led to an expansion of the components that refer to a country with a social insurance for all citizens, particularly after 1945, when the soviet military and political force seemed much bigger. Without the Russian revolution, the world could hardly had experienced such type of Pan-European Keynesianism as we experienced".<sup>217</sup>

"The lecture of the Russian revolution for all these movements (nationalist movements and rebellions in the imperial structures – Austria-Hungary, Russia, the Ottoman Empire, however also the similar movements in Asia-China, India, the Philippines, Africa and Latin America-Mexico-author's note) was that beyond the European countries (as it was define by Russia and by these movements) may achieve liberation from the European control, industrialization and military force (particularly clearly expressed after World War II). While the French revolution instilled hope and expectations and increased the strives of the dangerous classes in the Pan-European world, the Russian revolution instilled hope and expectations and elevated the strives of the dangerous classes and the non-European world".<sup>218</sup>

Despite of the fact that the Russian revolution, as well as the French revolution was not entirely successful, regardless of the fact about the occurrence of the ghosts of the Stalinism, the members of the Gulag, Khrushchev and Gorbachev and in the end, the breakdown of the USSR and the communist party of the USSR in 1991, however their impact and contribution is enormous for the radical change during the history of humanity in the given historical epochs.

"The origin of the so called revolutionary upturns in the modern world is a difficult and a controversial issue, and I the first one to admit that these upturns generally do not represent spontaneous rebellions of the suppressed masses that are looking for a change of the world, rather an occasion – at least in the beginning – which was grabbed by separate groups in the moments of breakdown of the state order (for which they themselves sometimes contributed). No matter how these revolutions started, only the ones that attracted important popular support lasted".<sup>219</sup> The important national support, both moral and political, that is, the mobilization of the wide national-revolutionary masses represents one of the basic prerequisites for a successful realization of the revolutionary goals and continuation of their life.

"This doesn't mean that ordinary people supported the terror in the Gulag. Some did that, but many didn't. Some gave their support knowing of the terror. Some gave support to the revolutions against the terror. Many convinced themselves that they do not know of the terror. However, they indeed supported the revolution, at least within a longer period of time, because revolutions instilled hope in the situations that seemed hopeless to them, not only in the period before revolutions, but potentially hopeless also after some counter-revolution."<sup>220</sup>

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implies changes that transform the fundamental social structure and the way of functioning of the country for which it is assumed that it experienced revolutions.

<sup>215</sup> Wallerstein, I. (2002). *Utopistics: Or Historical Choices of the Twenty-First Century*. Skopje: Templum, p.

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<sup>216</sup> Ibid: p. 29.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid: p. 29-30.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid: p. 31.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid: p. 10-11.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid: p. 11-12.

## 5. CONCLUSION

The people in the eve of revolutions are really bitten with a sudden surge of hope (even of the great hope) which completely or partially can be transformed into a direction of a bigger equality between people (a hope that is important for them and their children) and in the direction of a greater freedom and democratization.

In this regard, it is also necessary to emphasize the effects of the world revolution from 1968 which led to a collapse of liberalism which was initiated by the world revolution in 1848, as a bracket of the theo-culture of the world system. And in 1968, everything flared quickly (of course much more globally than in 1948) and burned with almost the same speed. However, if observed on the long run, the effects were devastating for the system.

The world returned to the real trimodal ideological separation. The three decades after 1968 implied turning of the national support from the traditional anti-system movements (so called old left wings) in all parts of the world where they ruled, which actually represented a large part of the world in the 1970's.

The culmination of these omissions, the disappointment, betrayed expectations and lost hopes from the abandonment of their historical believe (and all this after one to two centuries of constant struggle, suffering and bleeding), was the spectacular (and literally with no drop of blood) destruction of communism in Eastern and Central Europe and in the former USSR.

“The new revolutions” for complete elimination of the remains from the former governing communist structures, further continue before the newly composed “Velvet revolutions”, “Bulldozer revolutions”, “orange” and other revolutions in different colors, that took place in the former communist countries.

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