### RURAL POLICY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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Abstract: The report examines rural development of the People's Republic of China and agricultural policy of the Communist Party of China in the second half of the 20th and early 21st centuries. After the end of World War II, the Chinese Communist Party largely secured its victory over the Kuomintang in the Civil War (1946-1949) thanks to the rural population of China, a predominantly agrarian country at the time. The reforms in the village envisage the implementation of an agrarian reform, expressed in the confiscation of land and means of production from the large landowners and wealthier peasants using hired labor and their distribution among the landless peasants. The first stage of the agrarian reform was carried out until 1952 and was related to the land acquisition of poor peasants. The second stage took place during the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) and was related to the collectivization of agriculture. In practice, the agrarian reform ends with the complete cancellation of private ownership of land. At the beginning of the period of the so-called "Great Leap Forward" (1958-1961), cooperatives were transformed into people's communes - basic public organizations in which agricultural and industrial production, trade, education, etc. was developed. After a short period of calm between 1962 and 1965, in May 1966 Mao Zedong launched the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", whose vanguard were the student-run "Red Guard Squads", the so-called "Hóng Wèibīng". Undoubtedly, the impact of the Cultural Revolution (May 16, 1966 - October 6, 1976) on the PRC in social, political, cultural and economic aspects was very negative. The economy was hit particularly hard in 1967-1968. The death of Mao Zedong on September 9, 1976, the elimination of the far-left Gang of Four, the complete seizure of power by Hua Guofeng on October 7, 1976, and the rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, set the stage for major changes in the country's economic management. The beginning of economic reform is associated with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Plenary Session after the 11th Congress of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held from December 18 to 22, 1978 in Beijing. The reforms start in the rural areas where 80% of China's population lived at that time and marked the beginning of the new path of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, initially reviving the family form of land management, and then developing channels for the sale of agricultural products, reviving rural enterprises related to the processing of raw materials from the rural economy. First coined by Deng Xiaoping in 1982, the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics aims to redefine the relations between planning and socialism, and market economy and capitalism. It has preserved institutions of socialism and public ownership while importing sophisticated management experience and advanced market mechanisms from developed countries. The term "socialist market economy" was introduced in 1992 by Jiang Zemin.

Keywords: China, PRC, CPC, Agricultural Policy, Rural Areas.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

In the first half of the 20th century, Chinese agriculture as a whole was deeply backward and closed in nature. The land mainly remains in the hands of large landowners, who lease it to landless peasants. The cultivation of the land is of low technical armament. Peasant tenants use labor or at best draft cattle, similar to methods used for thousands of years. Overcrowding in villages is an extremely serious socio-economic and socio-political problem. Despite the good natural conditions, yields per unit of cultivated area are not high. The situation in China's agriculture complements the general economic picture of the country as a whole - a semi-colonial, peripheral, pre-industrial country, torn by social and political contradictions, demonstrating economic development subordinated to foreign capital and countries (Stefanov & Koleva, 2015, 111-112). The CCP made its first attempt at large-scale reform in 1947-1948. However, due to the war with the Kuomintang, it was postponed. The general concept of this reform was formulated in the "Fundamentals of Land Law" adopted by the All-China Land Conference of the CCP on September 13, 1947. The goal is liquidation of the ownership of the big landowners on the land and equal right to own land. However, this leveling affects the interests of the middle class as well, damaging relations with the national bourgeoisie. Therefore, in February 1948, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued an order to end the agrarian reform in the newly liberated areas until the complete victory of the revolution. This question was raised again in the period 1949-1952. The agrarian reform is generally divided into two stages: first stage - Agrarian Reform - redistribution of land (1949-1952); second stage - Collectivization (1953-1957); (Stefanov & Koleva, 2015, 128).

### 2. PROCLAMATION OF THE PRC, LAND REDISTRIBUTION AND COLLECTIVISATION

On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China in Beijing, marking the beginning of a new stage in the development of the millennial state. The Chinese communists largely secured victory over the Kuomintang in the civil war that began in July 1946, thanks to the support of the rural population of China, a predominantly rural country at the time. The agrarian reform proclaimed by the CCP, initiated in the areas under the control of the Communist Party, promises the expropriation of the lands of the large landowners and redistribution in favour of the cultivators. The 3rd Plenary Session after the 7th National Congress of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China passed a law revoking the right of large landowners to own land, which came into effect on June 30, 1950. However, rich peasants can retain ownership of some land if they cultivate it themselves or with the help of farmhand. Confiscated land is distributed equally among the villagers in the respective area. Due to the different population density in the individual regions, in practice, the peasants do not receive the same amount of land in different regions. Despite the many problems that this reform faces, it enables millions of Chinese not only to free themselves from their subservient existence and feed themselves, but also to begin solving the most important issue - China's food security. In its essence, agrarian reform means a radical antifeudal revolution carried out by the people's power from the top down under the leadership of the Communist party of China (CPC). From 1946 to 1953, 300 million peasants received 47 million hectares of land against a total cultivated land in 1952 in China of 108 million hectares. 43.5% of the cultivated land was distributed to the peasants (Stefanov & Koleva, 2015, 128-129). On completion of the Agrarian reform of 1949 to 1952 in all regions of China, through which each rural resident obtained a share of land, Chinese agriculture was confronted with a choice between two paths of development. At that time, two groups held opposing views within the leadership of the CPC. Supported by Liu Shaoqi, one group included Deng Zihui, leader in charge of rural affairs in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, among others. This group was faithful to the guiding principle confirmed at the 7th National Congress of the CPC in 1945, which dictated that realization of socialism should take two steps: first, to develop the new democracy, to be followed by the second step, a march toward socialism. They believed that farmers should be given the freedom to buy and sell land, lease land, hire labor, and borrow money and that the idea of immediately shake, weaken, or deny the foundation of private ownership and collectivize agriculture would be a mistaken, dangerous, and unrealistic thought of agrarian socialism. Represented by Mao Zedong, the other group believed that the Agrarian reform had already completed the democratic revolution; therefore "composing the article of socialist revolution" should be put on an agenda. Their approach was to energetically promote mutual aid teams and cooperatives to achieve "socialist transformation of agriculture". The result of this contention was a campaign launched by Mao Zedong in mid-1955 against the "Right opportunism" of Deng Zihui, leader in charge of rural affairs and head of the Rural Work Department of CCCPC, and others and then an "upsurge of socialism in rural areas" promoted by party and government organs at various levels. The reason for Mao Zedong to choose the second path was related to two more important choices he made in 1952 that involved the entire national economy: 1) the decision to immediately start the transition to socialism and a planned economy at the end of 1952 and the beginning of 1953; 2) the decision to implement industrialization with priority given to the development of heavy industry during the First Five Year Plan, starting in 1953. In this context it become necessary to organize farmers into collective economic organizations under state control so that the state could obtain, by nonmarket means, capital, grain, and raw materials indispensable to industrialization with priority given to heavy industry (Wu, 2005, 96-97). At the end of 1952, the CCP developed the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), the main objectives of which were: concentration of efforts for the construction of 156 largest objects with the help of the USSR, as well as 694 large and medium-sized enterprises, which to become the basis of socialist industrialization; accelerated establishment of agricultural and craft cooperatives; transformation of national capitalist industry on the rails of state capitalism. Directly related to the First Five-Year Plan and the new path that China is taking is the implementation of the second stage of the agrarian reform - large-scale collectivization of agriculture, carried out in general along the Soviet model. At the beginning of this stage, villagers band together in mutual aid brigades and work in seasonal campaigns, using not only their personal labor but also their personal inventory. Later, cooperatives of agricultural producers were created; not only the labor, but also part of the cultivated land became public, although formally the land continued to be considered the property of the individual peasant. The last, final stage is characterized by the deployment of activity on the creation of large cooperatives, almost identical to the Soviet collective farms. The most important feature of the last stage is not only the scale of these cooperatives, but also that all land is now collectively owned. In fact, agrarian reform began as a campaign to redistribute land so that every landless peasant received a piece of land. In practice, it ends with the collectivization of this same land and the complete annulment of private ownership of it By the end of 1956, about 96% of rural farms were members of cooperatives. At the time of the completion of the agrarian reform in 1957, there were 760-800 thousand cooperatives, each of which united about 160 families (Stefanov & Koleva, 2015, 137-139).

### 3. THE GREAT LEAP AND THE ADJUSTMENT COURSE

The so-called "Great Leap Forward" (1958-1961) in the politics of the CCP and the People's Republic of China is a utopian attempt for accelerated development that is inconsistent with reality. It is a consequence of the political, ideological and generally the entire social atmosphere that makes this phenomenon possible. At the 2<sup>nd</sup> Plenary Session after the 8th Congress of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in May 1958, a new general line was proposed, which became known as the "Three Red Banners". After a review of the planning assignments in May 1958, it was predicted that in the second five-year period (1958-1962) industrial production would increase 6.5 times, and agricultural production - by 2.5 times. In fact, the Second Five-Year Plan for the development of the national economy was canceled and Mao demonstrated his independence in the adoption of key economic decisions, as well as his independence from the USSR. The content of this policy is reduced to accelerating the pace of modernization of the country. The "Great Leap Forward" is oriented towards overmobilization in the sphere of both industry and agriculture. The main means by which this task should be achieved are not economically justified factors, but the enthusiasm of the masses (Stefanov & Koleva, 2015, 165-167). On July 1. 1958, speaking at a mass rally to celebrate "July 1st" at Peking University, Chen Boda conveyed the latest directive from Mao Zedong, "Comrade Mao Zedong said that our direction should be to organize gradually and orderly the 'industry, agriculture, commerce, education and defense' into a big commune, thereby forming the basic unit of Chinese Society." On August 9, 1958, during his countryside inspection in Shandong Province, Mao Zedong said that "You had better set up a people's commune; its advantage is that it can integrate industry, agriculture, commerce, education, and defense, which is of convenience for executive leadership." From August 17 to 30, the Political Bureau of the CCCPC convened an enlarged meeting in Beidaihe, a coastal summer resort. In addition to calling on the party and the people to make the greatest efforts to achieve the objectives of the "Great Leap Forward", the resolution of the meeting also pointed out that "The people's commune will be the best form of organization for construction of socialism and gradual transition to communism....The realization of communism in China is no longer something distant in future, and we should actively make use of the form of the people's commune to try to find out a specific approach to communism." (Wu, 2005, 100). As early as August 1, 1958, issue 3 of "Red Banner" magazine published an article by one of the leaders of the CPC and party worker close to Mao, Chen Boda, "Completely New Society, and Completely New People." It advocates the idea that agricultural cooperatives need to be reformed so that they become units for the production of both agricultural and industrial output. In the 4th issue of the same magazine, Chen Boda in his article "Under the Banner of Comrade Mao Zedong" quotes the party leader's words that the course of development should be in the direction of the step-by-step construction of large communes - basic public organizations in which develop agricultural production, industrial production, trade, education, military affairs. In fact, the people's communes were created as paramilitary organizations on the principle of equalization and united the majority of China's population. On the one hand - these are production-economic units, on the other - low-level socio-political structures. The principle in the establishment of the people's communes is that the means of production and all the property of the individual cooperatives become the property of the people's communes that the accounts of the commune are kept uniformly. They existed until 1982, when the last communes were disbanded. As a result of the "Great Leap Forward", the production of agricultural products fell sharply. As a result of the campaign, in which the efforts of a huge number of people were thrown, there was a sharp decline in grain production. As a result of the "Three Red Banners" course, the situation in the country in terms of food supply is deteriorating. In 1960, a wave of mass starvation began in a number of regions. Seen from a purely instrumental point of view, the "Great Leap" is an expression of two clashes - the administrative-voluntarism one and the systemic-planning one. The first takes a peak in view of the fact that behind it stands such an influential person in the state and party plan as Mao Zedong. The famine that gripped the country became a source of mass discontent, including armed uprisings such as that in Tibet, as well as flights from China, such as that of tens of thousands of Tibetans to India and of Uyghur from Xinjiang to the USSR. Only then did the leadership of the CCP and the PRC, under the influence of the wave of mass discontent, realize the real situation. Mao Zedong was forced to relinquish the post of Chairman of the PRC, subsequently held by Liu Shaoqi. In fact, the group of moderates comes to the fore in the economic leadership of the country, where besides Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and others also enter. In this way, Mao shifted some of the responsibility to these leaders. There is no open recognition of the mistakes made during the Great Leap, but the policy is actually changing (Stefanov & Koleva, 2015, 168-178). The period of economic regulation, which took place from 1961 to 1965, opened a new page in the development of the PRC. Its official beginning was made at the 9th Plennary Session of the 8th National Congress of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on January 18, 1961. At this plenum, the focus was mainly on stimulating agriculture and light industry at the expense of sharply reducing the volume of industrial production and optimizing capital investments in industry. The activity of the market has been restored under the conditions of its regulation. The people's communes were completely rebuilt. It was decided,

despite the preservation of the system of communes, to divide them into smaller ones in order to manage them more rationally. The main production unit became the brigade. At the same plenum, on the proposal of Liu Shaoqi, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adopted the "Three Self and One Package" program, the task of which was to mitigate the consequences of the Maoist course of "Three Red Banners". Peasants were allowed to own small plots of land, open small craft workshops and sell in local markets. Quotas are also established for the guaranteed purchase of agricultural products by the state. An important role in the regulation process was played by Deng Xiaoping, who from 1956 was elected to the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP, while Mao continued to be the Chairman of the CCP (Stefanov & Koleva, 2015, 179-180).

#### 4. THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

During the Cultural Revolution communes remained the dominant rural unit of economic organization. Mao's concerns about "bourgeois" infiltrators in his party and government - those not sharing his vision of communism were outlined in a Chinese Communist Party Central Committee document issued on May 16, 1966; this is considered by many historians to be the start of the Cultural Revolution (in full Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution), although Mao did not formally launch the Cultural Revolution until August 1966, at the 11th Plenary Session after the 8th Congress of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. He shut down China's schools, and during the following months encouraged Red Guards to attack all traditional values and "bourgeois" things and to test party officials by publicly criticizing them. Mao's own personality cult assumed religious proportions. The resulting anarchy, terror and paralysis completely disrupted the economy. During the earliest part of the Red Guard phase, key Politburo leaders were removed from power - most notably President Liu Shaoqi, Mao's designated successor until that time, and Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping. When the 9th Congress of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China convenes in April 1969, Defense Minister Lin Biao was officially designated as Mao's successor, and the military tightened its grip on the entire society. Lin quickly encountered opposition. Mao himself was wary of a successor who seemed to want to assume power too quickly, and he began to maneuver against Lin (Lieberthal, 2023). In a desperate move to avoid being purged, Lin and others of the military high command plotted a coup that failed. The Chinese government later announced that Lin was killed on September 13, 1971, in an airplane crash in Mongolia as he was fleeing to the Soviet Union after having plotted unsuccessfully to assassinate Mao. Since then he has been posthumously criticized as a rightist reactionary and a traitor to the cause of Chinese communism (Rhoads, 2022). Initially, Premier Zhou Enlai benefited the most from Lin's death, and from late 1971 through mid-1973 Zhou tried to nudge China back toward stability. He encouraged a revival of the educational system and brought back into office a number of people who had been cast out. China began again to increase its trade and other links with the outside world, and the economy continued the forward momentum that had begun to build in 1969 (Lieberthal, 2023). After Nixon's national security adviser Henry Kissinger met with Zhou Enlai on his secret trip to Beijing on July 9-11, 1971, Zhou's reputation as a diplomat and negotiator greatly increased. The historic meeting between Mao Zedong and U.S. President Richard Nixon that took place in Beijing in February 1972 was, to a great extent, arranged and implemented by Zhou (USC US-China Institute, 2011). In early 1973 Zhou and Mao brought back to power Xiaoping. Zhou hoped to groom him to be Mao's successor. Deng, however, had been the second most important purge victim at the hands of the radicals during the Cultural Revolution. His reemergence made Jiang Oing and her followers desperate to firmly establish a more radical path. From mid-1973 until Mao's death in September 1976, Chinese politics shifted back and forth between Jiang Qing and those who supported her (notably Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan, who with Jiang Qing were later dubbed the Gang of Four), and the Zhou-Deng group. The former favoured ideology, political mobilization, class struggle, anti-intellectualism, egalitarianism, and xenophobia, while the latter promoted economic growth, stability, educational progress, and a pragmatic foreign policy. Mao tried unsuccessfully to maintain a balance between these two forces while he struggled to find a successor who would embody his preferred combination of each. By July 1974, however, the resulting economic decline and increasing chaos made Mao shift back toward Zhou and Deng. Zhou died in January 1976, and Deng was formally purged (with Mao's backing) in April. Only Mao's death in September and the purge of the Gang of Four by a coalition of political, police, and military leaders in October 1976 paved the way for Deng's subsequent reemergence in 1977 (Lieberthal, 2023). In this situation, a compromise figure was found in the person of Hua Guofeng, who, after the death of Zhou Enlai, was appointed acting prime minister, on February 4, 1976. A little later, on April 6, 1976, he was elected First Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China, i.e. Mao's immediate deputy, while at the same time being confirmed as Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China. On October 7, 1976, almost a month after Mao Zedong's death, Hua Guofeng became Chairman of the CPC and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. A day earlier, he took the initiative to arrest the members of the "Gang of Four" (Stefanov & Koleva, 2015, 202-204).

### 5. THE ECONOMIC REFORMS AFTER 1978

The new leader, Hua Guofeng, rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping in 1977, which in April 1976 was removed from all posts, following a campaign by the "Gang of Four" against him. Around the latter, however, a group with more liberal views was formed, which in the fall of 1978 held a victory over Hua Guofeng's group. Deng Xiaoping allows Hua Guofeng to retain his membership in the Central Committee and retire with dignity, setting a precedent that the loss of high-level leadership does not lead to repression. Deng Xiaoping became the de facto leader of the PRC. Among the new leadership of the CCP and the People's Republic of China, ideas are beginning to crystallize that the main drawback of the previous economic development is excessive centralization. Therefore, there are two ways to activate business entities: 1) More and more decision-making powers to be transferred to local authorities and individual production units; 2) To stimulate the material interest of individual economic units. Deng Xiaoping calls this model "economic democracy". Deng Xiaoping first expressed the view that it was possible for a section of the population to initially earn higher incomes and live better lives. I.e. in the foreground as the driving force of economic development, material interest is placed, not the revolutionary spirit. Most important in this case is the different assessment of the role of the market. It is beginning to be argued that the law of value works better under conditions of market relations than under a centrally-planned model. The general message is the call "To combine the planned economy with the market economy" (Stefanov & Koleva, 2015, 223-224). Back in July 1962, Deng Xiaoping famously said "It doesn't matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice" (China Daily, 2014). The beginning of economic reform is associated with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Plenary Session after the 11<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held from December 18 to 22, 1978 in Beijing. Even then, agriculture was assessed as extremely backward. Only through the restoration and rapid development of this fundamental unit in the national economy is it possible to raise the standard of living of the people. The plenary accepts specific documents for the implementation of this task. After discussion and additions, the documents were adopted and became the basis for work throughout the country. From this plenum onwards, the weight of the leadership work of the Central Committee of the CPC in the field of agriculture shifted from the field of class struggle to that of economic construction. It is the reforms in agriculture that mark the beginning of the new path of building socialism with Chinese characteristics (Stefanov & Koleva, 2015, 232). Different methods for correcting the labor share have been proposed in the literature (Dimanov, 2018, 242). The main goal of the agricultural reform carried out in China after 1978 was to abolish the three-tier system of the people's communes (commune - large production brigade - brigade) and create a two-tier system (production brigade - family), as well as to introduce a chord system of organization of work. With the introduction of the contract organization of work, it becomes clear that commodity production is impossible without specialization and concentration. The contract system, according to the forms of work, is divided into two types: a contract of a listed section without sector division of labor and a specialized contract (units, individual). With the full family chord, the process of specialization begins to develop at the level of family farms. According to their origin, specialized family farms are divided into two categories: selfemployed and contract. There are 4 forms of chord specialized family farms: 1) specialized farms that work the land on the basis of the agreement with the brigade; 2) specialized farms that received collective production facilities (companies, workshops, etc.); 3) specialized farms by handing over a chord to the individual worker from the specialized units of forest farms, private plantations, etc.; 4) specialized farms that develop domestic auxiliary crafts on the basis of direct contractual relations with commercial organizations. It is known that the family form of farming was introduced in the early 1980s and the villagers were given the right to enter into contracts for the use of the land for 15 to 30 years. Land ownership was transferred to village cooperatives: by 1992, 2.05 million such cooperatives had been established, covering 76% of villages. 43% of the available production funds in the villages were at their disposal. Their duty was to keep the irrigation facilities in working order and to help the villagers by providing machinery, processing the produce, delivering it to the market and familiarizing them with the scientific and technical achievements in the field of agriculture. As a result of the spread of the family chord, the family economy is reviving in China: about 200 million small agricultural farms are emerging. The question of land ownership with a view to its most efficient use is a subject of wide discussion. Many authors believe that the reason for this is the uncertainty of its ownership. The main argument is that with the existing system of its use, the villagers do not show sufficient interest in maintaining the long-term fertility of the soil. It is considered that the extension of the lease agreement from 15 to 30 years did not help to remove this obstacle. Although with the introduction of the new system of land management, the operation of the market mechanism in agriculture was greatly expanded, it was not enough. Throughout the reorganization that was taking place, it was felt that something was missing to move agriculture forward even more rapidly. It was necessary to continue improving the reform in the direction of expanding the action of the market mechanism. State purchases of agricultural production in 1984 were 1.63 times larger than the annual average in the period 1974-1978. However, this has put the state in a difficult position regarding the transportation and storage of the sharply increased amount of purchased agricultural produce.

For this reason, in 1985 it gave up its monopoly right to buy and store agricultural products, replacing it with the system of contractions with a significant reduction in the amount of their purchases. Under this system, the peasants got the opportunity to sell a significant part of their production on the market themselves. The network of markets for free trade in agricultural products was expanded. With reason, this is defined as the second stage of the reform in Chinese agriculture, during which a qualitative change in the economic relations between the state and the peasants occurs in the development of market relations. Usually, this case is evaluated as a transition of agricultural producers to the regime of full economic account. In 1988, a proposal appeared in China to turn land into a commodity and to allow the peasant's personal ownership of it. It was obvious the need for the peasants to feel the regulating role of the market mechanism even more tangibly, to achieve greater justice in the assessment of their work and in general in the distribution of the value newly created in agriculture. They had full reason for this, since according to calculations it was established that 2/3 of the income received from agriculture in the state is used for the development of industry and other branches of the national economy. This is understandable, since in this way the state sought to accelerate the development of branches outside agriculture and especially industry (Popov, 2011, 81-86).

#### 6. RESULTS

China has succeeded in producing one fourth of world's grain and feeding one fifth of world's population (the total number of Chinese population at the mainland in 2022 was 1.412 billion - of this total, rural permanent residents numbered 0.514 billion, accounting for 36.4%) with less than 10% of world arable land, which is great achievement in pursuit of food and nutrition security not only in China but also in the world. Currently, China ranks first in the world in terms of the production of cereals, cotton, fruit, vegetables, meat, poultry, eggs and fishery products. China is not only self-sufficient in agricultural production, but became an exporter of large quantities to the international market (FAO, 2023); (WBG, 2023). On August 23, 2021, the Chinese government unveiled a plan for the green development of the country's agricultural sector over the next five years. The plan, jointly issued by six departments including the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, identified resource protection, pollution control, restoration of agricultural ecology, and the development of a low-carbon agricultural industrial chain as the key tasks for the 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan period (2021-2025). By 2025, China aims to significantly improve the utilization of agricultural resources, the environmental quality of producing areas, the agricultural ecosystem, the supply of green products, and the ability to reduce emissions and sequester carbon (Yumei, 2021).

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