THE TOTALITY OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

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Abstract: One of the perceptions of the institution relates to such forms of social organisation which are characterised by a clear and specific order, and particularly are intended to subordinate people's behaviours to special rigours. Philosophy is an integral element of the development forces of society. It also influences the changing world and is not the only dimension of its explanation. As if different ideological fields, especially those that are more distant from the social base, which are determined by the economic moment, mostly only through the various links of social superstructure, social psychology and other concrete forms of social consciousness, thus the reverse impact of these ideological forms (especially religion and philosophy) on the social basis is usually carried out through the various links that exist between the economic base and these more abstract conceptual forms. Totality may be subject to analysis both in the aspect of its intensity and the number of barriers that are used by it.
Keywords: philosophy, social phenomena, totality, social superstructure.

1. INTRODUCTION

Totality is a concept of the total perception of phenomena in personal and social space. In some philosophical concepts, it arises from the noosphere saturation, economic and technological overload and interaction between knowledge growth, consciousness and human activity. A particularly interesting sociological element is the influence of philosophy, as a particular form of conceptual superstructure, on the movement of social superstructure and the economic structure of society itself. On this occasion, Spencer's well-known thought can be used as a guide, that "philosophers have only interpreted the world differently; the point is to change it."

The views that philosophy is a science on the totality of social phenomena are supported by authors such as: Moris Ginsberg, Zhorzh Gurviqi and others. All of them maintain that their position, that philosophy should deal with the study of the totality of social phenomena, constitutes a complex approach to the treatment of philosophy. In the spirit of this methodology Ginzberg thinks that there are three main tasks (functions) that philosophy must have. They are:

• Creating a morphology or classifying the types and forms of social relationships, especially those that enter into various social institutions and associations;

• Researching people's relationships, but also scientific disciplines in all their forms of social life. For example, the relation of economics to politics, of morality to religion;

• Discovering the fundamental conditions of social change, in order to possibly find specific philosophical-sociological laws, which cannot be reduced to laws that govern life and the individual consciousness of organisms. This definition of the task of philosophy, according to Ginsberg, is quite complex and to a certain extent distinguishable from the definitions that other authors make of the subject of philosophy.

Indeed, philosophers have never interpreted the world alone, but have more or less consciously or unconsciously influenced the process of changing it. Plato's world of ideas remained not only the desired field of philosophy, but influenced the moral, legal, and artistic conceptions of the ancient world, the social institutions of the ancient polis, class relations, espousing the Slavonic order and the power of the Slavonic masters, who , as rulers, were the same bearers of the world of ideas. Plato's philosophy had a great influence not only on the further development of philosophy but also on the development of certain social movements. Can the great role of the philosophical materialism of the advanced era of the bourgeois class for the process of maturing revolutionary preparations to overthrow the feudal system be denied? Can it then be denied that the great importance of the influence of philosophical thought in preparing the conditions for a new vision of the purpose and role of man in general (Polisi, 2018).

In this connection the question arises: Was this influence direct or indirect, damaged by other means and through which it was exercised? The influence of philosophy on various social processes, namely on the economic development of the social base and on the speeding up of processes in transforming one social system into another, is largely indirect, but rarely direct; it performs through various intermediary links.

Philosophy influences other forms of ideology in morality, law, art, and especially in the psychology of the social age, which are at the same time the values of a given society. From a historical point of view, values are expressed as an old institution, encountered in almost every society. Even in the field of morality, values have a natural advantage because values are based on the same basis and essence and not foreign command (Brentano, 1934).

2. SOCIAL VALUES

The values themselves are, as a particular sequence of essences, presented in a hierarchically superior manner, so that our acting and appreciating are justified if they adhere to this hierarchy. While the real facts themselves cannot be ranked in the hierarchy, that is to say, high and low, the values according to their being that are hierarchically set, are distinguished in the high and the low. In addition, within each value mode the values are displayed in opposite pairs (nice - ugly, good - bad, liked - disliked, etc.). This hierarchy has attempted to fix Max Sheller (Scheler, 2014), pointing out that particular value modalities include, are "recognized" through particular acts and spiritual potentials, namely that value modalities cannot be recognized by any act, but by specific acts. certain and affiliation.

In the first place, the lowest in this value hierarchy lie the values of the likes and dislikes (hedonistic values). To the psychological structure of man responds the function, namely the acts of sensory feeling. This value order is relative in that it assumes the existence of a general sensory nature (as to whether something is liked or disliked), but is not relative in the sense that it would depend on a particular organization of a nature nor by certain real-world objects and processes that are "liked" or "disliked" for a given organization. ,, Although the same process for one person may be pleasing and unpleasant for another (namely for animals), nevertheless the change of the pleasurable value itself is an absolute change that is clear before recognizing these facilities" (Scheler, 2014).

The second value mode consists of the values of vital feeling (vital values). These include the contrasting 'generous' (respectively' good 'in the sense of the strong, the weak) and the ordinary' ('simple') value pairs. This includes all conditions related to health, old age, etc.

In the third place are spiritual values. So come the aesthetic (beautiful-ugly) values of right and wrong and the values of "pure knowledge of the truth". According to Schiller, these spiritual values "contain in themselves as they are given a separate and separate independence from the whole body and circle (Umweltsphare), and appear as unity with the very fact that there is clear evidence of them, , need "vital" vital values (Scheler, 2014). The acts and functions by which these values are embodied are acts of spiritual feeling.

In the fourth place are the values of the holy and the unholy. "These appear in the objects which are in essence given as" absolute things " (Scheler, 2014).

In this whole kingdom of values there is, according to Scheler, the valid a priori hierarchy, so that "generous" values are superior to "like" values, spiritual values are higher modalities than vital values, and values, , holy "is higher than spiritual values (Brentano, 1934).

Shelter, therefore, at least at the stage when writing his basic ethico-axiological work "Formalismus in der Ethik", considers the sacred, namely, religiosity of the highest value. In doing so he presents himself as a prominent reactionary ideologue of the church. If, however, if we look at the problem of rapport and the hierarchy of values historically, then we can prove, like Zhorzh Gurvic (Georgos Gurvitch, 1930), that progress in Renaissance culture was made possible and developed precisely because of the destruction of a religious value, and towards the pluralism of higher values. For the scientist (as a scientist) the truth must be of the highest value, for the artist-beauty, and if their creativity was subordinated to the "saint," then that would be an obstacle to progress in the direction of beauty as well. even of the truth.

However, the relationship between other values is not in any case hierarchical in the way that Shelter puts it. Gurvich has already rightly asked, for example, the question: would we consider saving an artistic (good aesthetic) photograph rather than a child (vital value) if both are in danger? But by what signs can we know that one value is higher than the other?

First, the values are higher if they are more stable. But when said so, it is not thought of as the possibility of extending the value carrier itself but of the value itself (Scheler, 2014). Sensory pleasure is, for example, less enduring, more transient than spiritual values.

Second, the values are higher if they participate less in extensiveness and divisibility. This also means that the values are higher if the goods in which they are displayed can be less divisive and in this case more people enjoy them. A bread or material good in general is needed so that many people can enjoy it. Hence it is in the being of material goods and values that it causes conflict of interest. These divide and do not bring together the individuals they desire. Against them, spiritual values, namely good things (works of art, etc.) do not have to be shared to find joy in them. These unite and do not divide.

According to Schiller, no value unites people as much as the value of the sacred. Indeed, he acknowledges that the concrete symbols of the sacred divide the people, yet he claims that the sacred as such unites. "Although it was in fact considered sacred throughout history, it divided people (for example in religious wars and confessional disputes), yet at the core of the sacred intent lies that it unites and links them. Any possible division here lies only in its symbols and techniques and not in their own (Scheler, 2014). With regard to this text, namely the meaning expressed in it, the question must be asked: but where is this, the only sacred one? And this concrete sanctuary really united and separated people, united them within one group, one people, one group of peoples and separated them

from others, which means that it was and is a form of separation their true truth, that is, the opposed and divided, and not some substance that "as such" unites, and through its own symbols and techniques!

Third, values are higher if they are established and conditioned by other values. So, for example, the 'useful' value is based on the 'liked' value, because something is useful if it serves as a tool for the realization of the likes, the pleasures, so the usefulness is lower . Likewise, hedonistic values are based on vital, and vital on spiritual. Life rejects its value by serving spiritual values (Scheler, 2014).

Fourth, values are higher if they have a "depth of pleasure", but not an ordinary sensory pleasure, but "the experience of fulfillment" (Erfullungserlebnis). "Deeper" than the other we call a pleasure in the sense of some value if its existence is shown to be independent of the sense of other values, and vice versa. Thus, for example, the sensual pleasures and naive joys of any solemnity or walk only satisfy us if we are content in the deep realm of our being, in what is most "serious" for us. The unhappiness in this deep layer is often the cause of uninterrupted running after joy. "Each of the one thousand forms of practical hedonism is always a sign of 'no satisfaction' in terms of high values" (Polisi, 2018).

Finally, the fifth criterion for the height of a value is the degree of its relativity or its relation to "absolute values". The value of 'liking' is' relative ', it refers to the being that sensually feels, it is conditioned by the existence of such being, and there are' absolute values', and these would be 'they the values that exist for a "pure" feeling (supposed, loved ones), that is, for a feeling that is independent of the being of sensuality and of being in relation to its functioning and its laws of operation (Georgos Gurvitch, 1930). Such would be spiritual values in general.

In pre-industrial societies values have been less differentiated from the object to which they have always been oriented. Their knowledge in those societies has been very low, so scientific analysis of them has not been at the proper analytical level.

With the development of societies, the need for recognition and the role they have had in society has increased. Thus, with the first attempts at their recognition, philosophy began. From her point of view she raised the principle question for their analysis, namely: are there values objectively and independently of man and his assessments, or are they merely subjective projections that people give to things which they use in society.

The notion of value can be differentiated in many ways. In axiology, value has the function of orienting the criteria of value, such as beauty, good, wisdom.

In the opinion of A. Agnesh Heleres, philosophy has always studied values, and that it can best respond to their objectivity or subjectivity.

The medieval philosophical explanation given to values has been based on religious concepts. That explanation is based on the principle that one should leave God and man's destiny. Through these links philosophy influenced certain social institutions, the politics of certain classes, and thus the activity of the people belonging to these classes. It is only through these links that philosophical conceptions exert influence on the economic basis of society.

3. CONCLUSION

Philosophy is therefore an integral element of the development forces of society. It also influences the changing world and is not the only dimension of its explanation. Like the various ideological fields, especially those that are more distant from the social base, which are determined by the economic moment, mostly only through the various links of social superstructure, social psychology and other concrete forms of social consciousness, thus the reverse impact of these ideological forms (especially religion and philosophy) on the social basis is usually carried out through the various links that exist between the economic base and these more abstract conceptual forms (Polisi, 2018).

They "exert the opposite effect on all economic development" but mostly through a range of elements and indirect causes.

If certain philosophies have an active influence on the process of movements and various socio-political and economic wars, then it can be deduced from this that in the scientific study of such movements one must also take into account the philosophy of a particular era, regardless of the active impact it will have and how that impact is exercised, ie. through which links.

There are two main directions in the philosophy of history so far: philosophical materialism and philosophical idealism. Philosophical materialism holds that matter is of primary importance, whereas the spirit world was born in the process of the development of matter, as a special quality of highly organized matter. On the contrary, philosophical idealism is such a philosophical system that one thinks that the spiritual substance is primary and the demigod of material reality. The ideal world has existed before the material world, it is the creator of the material substance. The eternal is only the world of ideas, and the material world is only a dim copy of the world of ideas, as the ancient philosopher Plato used to say, one of the greatest idealistic philosophers.

The study of totality, due to a wide spectrum of application of this concept, particularly in the institutional context, gives rise to many problems and requires a relatively diverse knowledge from different fields of social life. The research tools being proposed allow one to standardise especially the measurements of totality in quantitative research and establish a common ground for comparative analyses (Szczepański, 1970). The two main philosophical directions have different variants, which have arisen in the process of developing philosophical thought. The main variants of philosophical materialism are: ancient materialism, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century mechanical materialism, and dialectical materialism. The main forms of philosophical idealism are: objective and subjective idealism, whose ultimate consequence is solipsism. The particular philosophical direction that arose towards reconciling these two extreme philosophical forms is philosophical dualism. According to this, there are two basic substances, separated from one another - Matter and the soul. Unable to interpret the relation between these two substances, and the relation and relation between them cannot be denied, philosophical dualism is greatly reduced to materialism or idealism.

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